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COMMERCIAL EXPLOITATION OR
PROTECTED USE?
STERN v. DELPHIINTERNET SERVICES
CORPORA TION
AND THE EROSION OF THE RIGHT OF
PUBLICITY

Aaron J. Reber*

Karin Mika-*

INTRODUCTION

Freedom of expression preserves

all other liberties

so

inseparably that freedom of the press and a free society either
prosper together or perish together. Yet, because of its enormous
power, the contemporary press is widely, and perhaps accurately,
perceived as using its special First Amendment status as a license
to invade individual privacy. 1 Although the actual wording of the
First Amendment does not explicitly state a guaranteed right to
* Associate, Chattman, Gaines & Stem, L.P.A.; Valparaiso University,
B.A.; Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, J.D.
** Assistant Director, Legal Writing, Research & Advocacy, Cleveland-

Marshall College of Law; Baldwin-Wallace College, B.A.; Cleveland State
University, J.D.
1. See Lerman v. Flynt Distrib. Co., Inc., 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984).
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privacy, 2 it is commonly understood that there are certain privacy
guarantees. These exist in both what is regarded as "a
fundamental right to privacy" 3 and within the scope of common
law protections. Within the common law, it has long been
recognized that certain intrusions into one's personal life would
4
be forbidden and actionable as a tort.
Intrusions into an individual's personal life are more likely
when the individual is a celebrity, even if only a temporary
celebrity, and the common law has recognized protections of a
"celebrity" from commercial exploitation. This protection has

been regarded as a "right of publicity." This right generally
means that an individual's "likeness," 5 when used for
commercial purposes without permission, enables that individual
to bring a tort action against the offending party. This "misuse"
of a person's likeness has been regarded as unprotected
commercial speech within First Amendment jurisprudence. 6
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I states: "Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of
grievances."
3. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
4. See Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 A.D. 467, 178
N.Y.S. 752 (1st Dep't 1919).
5. Likeness does not necessarily refer to a visual facsimile but can be an
identifiable characteristic of a person. See, e.g., Midler V. Ford Motor Co.,
849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 951 (1992) (voice as a
protected likeness). See also White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971
F.2d 1395 (9th Cir.) ("aggregate identifiable characteristics" may be
protected), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993).
6. See Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
The defendant used an actor who resembled Woody Allen to portray a
customer in an advertisement. Id. at 617. The actor was placed in a position
characteristic of the plaintiff with videotape cassettes of two of the plaintiff's
best known films. Id. at 618. The court enjoined defendant from representing
the look-alike actor as Woody Allen. Id. at 625; Onassis v. Christian DiorNew York, Inc., 122 Misc. 2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. New York
County 1984) (holding in a lawsuit brought by Jacqueline Kennedy Onassis
that a look-alike actress impermissibly misappropriated the plaintiff's identity),
aff'd, 110 A.D.2d 1095, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1st Dep't 1985).
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Many states have codified the common law right of publicity
concepts and enable an individual whose likeness has been
commercially exploited to bring a statutory cause of action
against the offending party. 7 One state that has such a statute is
the state of New York. This statute, appropriately named the
Civil Rights Law, 8 explicitly prevents the use of likeness,
without permission, for the purpose of financial gain. Although
the statute itself lists no exceptions to the rule, New York courts
have found First Amendment protections to override the statute in
two instances -- when the "likeness" is "incidental" to the entire
purpose for which the likeness is being used 9 and when the
"likeness" is used in association with something considered
"newsworthy." 10 In granting First Amendment protections in
either of these situations, the New York courts have looked to the

overall purpose of using a likeness. Even when profit is a motive
in the unauthorized use, courts may grant First Amendment
protections if the public interest or dissemination of
"newsworthy" information is the overall object of the scheme,
overriding whatever commercial benefit might be derived. 11
7. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344; FL. ST. § 540.08; IN. ST. § 3213-1-6 et seq.; KY. ST. § 391.170; Nv. ST. § 597.790; 12 OK. ST. § 1448;
UT. ST. § 45-3-3; VA. ST. § 8.01-40; Wi. ST. § 895.50.
8. N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1996).

9. See Finger v. Omni Publication Int'l. Ltd., 77 N.Y.2d 138, 143, 566
N.E.2d 141, 144, 564 N.Y.S.2d 1014, 1017 (1990) (holding that the
"newsworthiness exception" applies to reports of political happenings and
social trends, to news stories and articles of consumer interest, and to matters
of scientific and biological interest); University of Notre Dame Du Lac v.
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 22 A.D.2d 452, 454, 256 N.Y.S.2d 301,
304 aff'd, 15 N.Y.2d 940, 207 N.E.2d 508 (1965) (mentioning a person on
four pages of an 143 page volume was held to constitute only an isolated
reference of such fleeting and incidental nature as not be offensive to
provisions of the Civil Rights Statute).
10. See Freihofer v. Hearst, 65 N.Y.2d 135, 141, 480 N.E.2d 349, 354.
490 N.Y.S.2d 735, 740 (1985) (stating that the publication of a newspaper
article relating to the details of court files in a matrimonial proceeding fit
within the newsworthy exception and did not give rise to a cause of action for
invasion of privacy).
11. See Virelli v. Goodson-Todman Enterprise, Ltd., 142 A.D.2d, 479,
484, 536 N.Y.S.2d 571, 575 (3d Dep't 1989) (holding that in an action arising
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In 1995, the Supreme Court of New York County was, for the
first time, posed with the question of whether to extend First
Amendment protections to a quasi-commercial venture involving
the Internet and using the unauthorized picture of a celebrity for
advertising purposes. In Stern v. Delphi Internet Services
Corporation,12 the court acknowledged that, despite the
unauthorized use of Howard Stem's picture to advertise a "chat
session" 13 type computer bulletin board, the Internet provider
would enjoy First Amendment protections as a "news
disseminator" 14 under the New York Civil Rights Law. This,
despite the fact that the Internet provider was not primarily in the
news dissemination business, 15 despite the fact that the "chat
session" in question was for a limited time period, and despite
the fact that there was a degree of commercial motivation in the
scheme.
This article will address the repercussions of the Stern case. It
will compare the holding of Stern with what have traditionally
been regarded as violations of the right of publicity and argue
that the decision in Stern opens the door to a broader
interpretation of "newsworthiness" and "public interest" that will
enable advertisers broader First Amendment protections when
using "unauthorized" likenesses. In reaching its conclusion, the
article will specifically address the New York Civil Rights Statute
and discuss its exceptions determined by the New York courts. It
from the publication of a newspaper article, plaintiff failed to state a viable
claim for invasion of privacy because the challenged article dealt with a

newsworthy item and an invasion of privacy action must deal with a matter
published for trade or advertising purposes).

12. 165 Misc. 2d 21, 626 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1995).

13. Id. at 30, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 700. The "chat session" at issue can be
understood as an "electronic equivalent of a talk show . . . ." Id.
14. Id. at 26, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
15. For a discussion of the Internet as news disseminator in the defamation
context, see generally Philip H. Miller, New Technology, Old Problem:
Determining the FirstAmendment Status of ElectronicInformation Services, 61

FORDHAM L. REV. 1147 (1993) (discussing the historical tension between the
Constitution's ban on governmental interference with free speech and free
press and how the courts are dealing with the electronic information services).
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will address what the courts have considered worthy of First
Amendment protections and compare Stern to traditional
interpretations of news disseminators that have received
constitutional protections. This article will conclude by positing
that artful advertisers could very well use the theory of Stern as a
basis for virtually ensuring that every "unauthorized likeness"
will enjoy First Amendment protection and not be considered as
violative of the right of publicity.

I. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY
The right of publicity protects a celebrity's "attributes,"
including his or her "name, voice, or likeness[,J" from
exploitation. 16 It enables a celebrity to "cash in" on his or her
recognized identity, and prevents others from exploiting that
identity for their own monetary gain. The right ensures both that
a celebrity can prevent his or her likeness being associated with
promoting a particular product, or simply being used in
conjunction with a commercial scheme that monetarily benefits
an individual other than the celebrity. 1 7 The right is unique in
that it is assignable 18 and, in many cases, descendible.

19

States

16. See generally Melvin B. Nimmer, The Riglu of Publicity, 19 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 203, 204 (1954) ("outlinfing] the inadequacy of traditional
legal theories in protecting publicity values and... discuss[ing] the probable
substance of and limitations on the right of publicity .... .").
17. See generally Sheldon W. Halpern, The Right of Publicity:
ConunercialExploitation of the Associative Value of Personality. 39 VAND L.
REV. 1199, 1202 (1986) (discussing the development of the right of publicity.
claiming that the function was born out of "the societal recognition that as
commercial value may be associated with the persona of celebrity, land] should
serve as the primary tool for shaping the form and context of the right").
18. Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953). Defendant, a rival manufacturer.
deliberately induced a ballplayer who was under contract with the plaintiff to
sign a contract allowing him to use the ballplayer's picture. Id. at 867. The
court held that defendant was not liable for any breach of contract with
plaintiff, because a person's picture is assignable, as long as the defendant does
not use the picture while the ballplayer is under contract with the plaintiff. Id.
at 869.
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have enacted laws that protect the right for many years after the
20
celebrity has passed away.
The right of publicity is commonly understood to have
originated in the case of Haelan Labs. v, Topps Chewing Gum
Inc.2 1 In this case, a New York court held that a celebrity had a
right to be able to "exclusively" contract for the use of his
likeness in conjunction with a commercial venture. 22 The court
declared there existed somewhat of a property interest in a crafted
public persona which was capable of legal protection distinct
from a right to privacy. 23 After Haelan, most states developed
their own renditions as to what would be included in a protected
24
right of publicity.

II. NEW YORK STATE STATUTES
New York has recognized the importance of the right of
publicity and has enabled individuals whose likenesses have been
commercially exploited to bring a statutory cause of action
against the offending party. 2 5 The state has codified this right of
publicity in two different statutory sections. Section fifty of the
19. For a comprehensive discussion on descendible rights of publicity, see
Joseph J. Beard, Casting Call at Forest Lawn: The Digital Resurrection of
Deceased Entertainers -- A 21st Century Challenge for Intellectual Property,
Law, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 101, 145-63 (1993).

20. Id. at 147.
21. 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953).
22. Id. at 868. Actually, Haelan is an unlikely candidate for being the

genesis of the right of publicity. It is more about a tortious interference with a
business relationship than it is a violation of a right of publicity.
23. Id. See Pamela Lynn Kunath, Note and Comment, Lights, Camera,
Animate! The Right of Publicity's Effect on Computer-Animated Celebrities,

29 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 863. The right of publicity is somewhat different than
the common law right to privacy. Id. at 878. The right to publicity protects a
rather unascertainable, yet admittedly profitable, right to market a crafted
persona. Id. The right to privacy, however, tends more to protect against
personal invasions that do not commercially capitalize on a celebrity's
appearance. Id.
24. Id. at 880.
25. See N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1996).
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New York Civil Rights Law is entitled "right of privacy" and
provides a criminal remedy using someone's likeness without
their consent. It states:
A person, firm or corporation that uses for
advertising purposes, or for the purposes of trade, the
name, portrait or picture of any living person without
having obtained the written consent of such person,
or if a minor of his or her parent or guardian, is
guilty of a misdemeanor. 26
Section fifty-one of the New York Civil Rights Law provides a
private cause of action for an injunction and for damages. It
states in pertinent part:
Any person whose name, portrait, picture or voice
is used within this state for advertising purposes or
for the purposes of trade without the written consent
first obtained as above provided may maintain an
equitable action in the supreme court of this state
against the person, firm or corporation so using his
name, portrait, picture or voice, to prevent and
27
restrain the use thereof.
The New York statutes have no listed exceptions to the general
right to privacy, but courts have interpreted the statutory sections
in ways that have found some non-consensual uses of a person's
26. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAv § 50 (McKinney 1996).
27. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAWv § 51. Section 51 of the New York Civil

Rights Statute provides for a harsher penalty by awarding exemplary damages,
if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant knowingly violated his or her
privacy. The statute states in pertinent part:

[Plaintiff] may also sue and recover damages for any injuries sustained
by reason of such use and if the defendant shall have knowingly used
such person's name, portrait, picture or voice in such manner as is
forbidden or declared to be unlawful by section fifty of this article, the
jury, in its discretion, may award exemplary damages.
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likeness to be protected by the First Amendment. 28 Both of these

"uses" stem from general First Amendment protections that

29
extend to traditional news media.

A. Incidental Use

One court-created exception to an individual's right of privacy
is the incidental use doctrine. Generally, courts have held that an
"incidental use" of a person's name or photograph for the
purpose of advertising or trade is not actionable as long as the use

is done in conjunction with what is considered a newsworthy
event, that which is in the public interest, or a promotion of the
informational product itself. 30 The incidental use exception was
first adopted by the New York courts in Humiston v. Universal
Films Mfg. Co. 3 1 In Humiston, the defendant Universal Films

published "Universal Animated Weekly" and "Universal Current
Events" film reels about weekly events. 32 The film contained
material about the plaintiff, who was a lawyer in New York
City. 33 The film represented her as she was engaged in legal
work connected with solving the mysterious disappearance and
murder of Ruth Cruger. 34 The defendant used the plaintiff's
28. See generally Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 48 A.D.2d 487, 371
N.Y.S.2d 10, (1st Dep't 1975), aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 897, 352 N.E.2d 584, 386
N.Y.S.2d 397 (1976).
29. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 297 (1964)
(holding that a public official may not recover damages for a defamatory
falsehood without proving actual malice: reckless disregard of the truth or
knowledge of falsity).
30. See Velez v. VV Pub. Corp., 135 A.D.2d 45, 47, 524 N.Y.S.2d 186,
187 (Ist Dep't 1988) (holding that subscription-soliciting advertisement was
incidental use and not a violation of the Civil Rights Statute because it
contained a reproduction of the plaintiff's photograph which had appeared in
an earlier edition of a newspaper).
31. See, e.g., Humiston v. Universal Films Mfg. Co., 189 A.D. 467, 178
N.Y.S. 752 (1st Dep't 1919).
32. Id. at 469, 178 N.Y.S. at 754.
33. Id. at 471, 178 N.Y.S. at 755.
34. Id. The body of the girl, primarily through the plaintiff's efforts was
discovered buried under a floor in the back of a shop. Id.
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name and picture, during the actual investigation and discovery,
35
to advertise the film.
The court held that the use of the plaintiffs name in the
approach to a theater and upon the billboards in front as
advertising or indicating what was to appear upon the screen
within the building was incidental to the exhibition of the film
itself, and was not a use of the picture or name for advertising
purposes within the meaning of the Civil Rights Statute. 36 The
court reasoned that the presentation of current events in a motion
picture film was no different from the presentation of the same
current events through the medium of a newspaper and that the
defendant was entitled to promote such a presentation. 37 It was
inconsequential to the court that the film could be profitable and
that using the plaintiff's picture in advertising the films could be
38
used to induce more people to see them.
The incidental use doctrine was also applied in the case of
Booth v. Curtis Publishing Co.39 In Booth, the plaintiff was a
well-known actress whose picture was taken for use in an article
to appear in a magazine concerning a resort she was staying at in
the West Indies. 40 The primary intended use of the photograph
was consented to by the plaintiff.4 1 Thereafter, the defendants
published the same photograph in a full-page advertisement of the
magazine in two other magazines, expressly presenting the
plaintiff's photograph as a sample of the contents of the
defendant's magazine. 42 The court held that the latter use of the
plaintiff's photograph was not a violation of the statute. 43 Rather,
it was incidental advertising relating to the sale and dissemination

35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 476, 178 N.Y.S. at 759.
Id. at 477, 178 N.Y.S. at 759.
Id. at 474, 178 N.Y.S. at 757.

Id.

39. 15 A.D.2d 343, 223 N.Y.S.2d 737 (1st Dep't 1962), aff'd. 11
N.Y.2d 907, 182 N.E.2d 812, 228 N.Y.S.2d 468 (1962).
40. Id. at 345, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 740.

41. Id.
42. Id. at 346, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 740.
43. Id. at 349, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 743.
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of the news medium itself. 44 The court reasoned that "as long as
the reproduction was used to illustrate the quality and content of
the periodical in which it originally appeared, the statute was not
violated., 45 The dissent in Booth, however, strenuously objected
to the court's creation of an exception to what it deemed was a
clear and unambiguous statute. 46 Judge Eager commented that
"the conferring of an exempt status upon this type of advertising
solicitation in behalf of a magazine or periodical publisher is to
47
judicially interpolate an exception not written in the statute."
He further stated that the statute should be construed and applied
liberally, for "'the purpose of the statute is remedial and rooted
in popular resentment at the refusal of the courts to grant

44. The court made a distinction between incidental and collateral
advertising, finding that the current use was incidental itself. Id. Collateral use
would have been found if the photograph was used to advertise an entirely
different medium. Id.
45. Id. at 350, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 744. See Namath v. Sports Illustrated, 48
A.D.2d 487, 371 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1st Dep't 1975), aff'd, 39 N.Y.2d 897, 352
N.E.2d 584 (1976). The court reasoned that the use of a photograph of the
plaintiff, an outstanding sports figure, was not violative of the Civil Rights
Law, even though the photograph was used without the plaintiff's consent. Id.
at 488, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 11. The defendant used the photograph in
advertisements promoting subscriptions of the defendant's magazine. Id. The
use was incidental advertising because the photograph was originally used with
Joe Namath's consent in conjunction with a previous news article. Id. The
court found the Booth case to be controlling and dispositive of the issue. Id. at
488, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 12. The court commented that the defendant's
subsequent republication of plaintiff's picture was "'in motivation, sheer
advertising and solicitation.'" Id. at 488, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 11 (quoting Booth
v. Curtis Publishing Co., 15 A.D.2d 343, 349, 223 N.Y.S.2d 737, 744 (1st
Dep't 1962)). Nevertheless, that alone was "'not determinative of the question
so long as the law accords an exempt status to incidental advertising of the
news medium itself. "' Id. at 488, 371 N.Y.S.2d at 11-12 (quoting Booth v.
Curtis, 15 A.D.2d 343, 349, 223 N.Y.S.2d 737, 744 (1st Dep't 1962)).
46. Booth, 15 A.D.2d 343, 353, 223 N.Y.S.2d 737, 747 (1st Dep't
1962).
47. Id.
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recognition to the newly expounded right of an individual to be
immune from commercial exploitation.' "48
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
addressed "incidental use" in the case of Lerman v. Flynt
Distributing Co., Inc. 49 In Lennan, the defendant's magazine,
Adelina, printed photographs of an anonymous actress who

appeared in Jackie Collins' and her husband's movie entitled
"The World is Full of Married Men." 50 The magazine
misidentified the actress as being Jackie Collins and printed on its
cover "In the Nude from the Playmen archives ... Jackie
Collins." 5 1 The misidentified actress appeared topless in one of
the pictures and in an orgy scene in the other. 52 The defendant
included in one of its "issue[s] a subscription solicitation page
that reprinted, in reduced size and among other reprinted Adelina
covers, the... cover page that claimed to contain a photo of
Jackie Collins." 53 The identical solicitation page appeared in a
54
subsequent issue six months later.
In reaching its decision, the court followed the long line of
New York case law in finding that "[b]ecause the solicitations
were designed simply to convey the nature and content of past"
publications of the defendant's magazine, the plaintiff could not
form the basis for a cause of action. 55 The court further noted
that New York recognized the long-standing First Amendment
media privilege of reporting the news using names and likenesses
without consent. 5 6 The court commented that "the trade purposes
prong of the statute may not be used to prevent comment on

48. Id. at 353-54, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 747 (quoting Flores v. Mosler Safe
Co., 7 N.Y.2d 276, 280-81, 164 N.E.2d 853, 855, 196 N.Y.S.2d 975, 978

(1959).
49. 745 F.2d 123 (2d Cir. 1984).
50. Id. at 127.
51. Id.
52. Id.

53. Id.at 128.
54. Id.

55. Id.
at 131.
56. Id.
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'57 It
matters in which the public has a right to be informed."
noted, however, that the privilege was limited and did "not
extend to commercialization of his personality through a form of
treatment distinct from the dissemination of news or
58
information.,,

B. Newsworthiness
The second exception to New York's Civil Rights Statute,
similar to the incidental use doctrine, is referred to as the
newsworthiness exception. It exempts the unauthorized use of a
likeness of a public figure used in conjunction with some
newsworthy topic, and, in some instances, exempts the
unauthorized use of anyone's likeness in conjunction with the
dissemination of matters related to the public interest. 5 9 The
newsworthiness exception is very similar to the incidental use
exception, with the incidental use exception having a closer tie to
advertising.
As an example of a use that is categorized as "newsworthy," in
Davis v. High Society Magazine, Inc.,60 the court held that
pictures of a well-known female boxer, posed nude in a boxing
61
scene, could be a newsworthy event for a great many people.
The photographs were published in a magazine called Celebrity
Skin, which specialized "in printing photographs of well-known
women caught in the most revealing situations and positions that
the defendants were able to obtain." ' 62 The court found that the
publication of pictures would be absolutely protected and took
special care to make sure that its reading and application of the
New York Civil Rights Statute did not conflict with traditional
57. Id. (quoting Gautier v. Pro-Football, Inc., 304 N.Y. 354, 359, 107
N.E.2d 485 (1952)).
58. Id. at 131.

59. See Alison Sachs, It's Up to You, New York -- It's Time for a Statutory
Right of Publicity, 20 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTs 59, 60 (1995) (discussing

the limited protection given by §§ 50-51 of the New York Civil Rights Law
and the
60.
61.
62.

need for new statutes protecting the right of publicity).
90 A.D.2d 374, 457 N.Y.S.2d 308 (2d Dep't 1983).
Id. at 383, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 315.
Id. at 375, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 310.
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First Amendment protections. 63 The court commented that "the
competing tensions between claims of invasion of privacy and the
constitutional rights of free speech and a free press compel a
careful delineation of the statute." 64 The purpose of the statute
was "to prohibit commercial misappropriation of a person's name
or picture [but] ... too rigorous [of an] application of the
legislative prohibition would impinge on our ideals of freedom of
65
speech and the press."
In Stephano v. News Group Publications, Inc. ,66 the court held
that the defendant's publication of plaintiff's picture was
protected by the newsworthiness exception. 67 The plaintiff, a
professional model, claimed that the defendant's use of a picture
originally taken to be included in the "Fall Fashions" issue of
68 The
New York Magazine was an invasion of privacy.
defendant used another of the pictures from the original photo
shoot in a separate column that "contain[ed] information about
new and unusual products and services available in the
metropolitan area.,, 69 The court commented that "the
newsworthiness exception applies not only to reports of political
happenings and social trends, but also to news stories and articles
of consumer interest including developments in the fashion
world. "70
In reaching its decision, the court in Stephano stated that it was
well-settled that a picture illustrating an article on a matter of
public interest is protected as newsworthy unless it has no real
relationship to the article: for example, an advertisement in
disguise. 7 1 Alternatively, as in the case of Lerman v. Flynt
Distributing Co., Inc., "a plaintiff may claim that the defendant
forfeited the privilege for reporting [on] matters on which the
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Id. at 379, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 313.
Id. at 378, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 312.
Id. at 381-82, 457 N.Y.S.2d at 314-15.
64 N.Y.2d 174, 474 N.E.2d 580, 485 N.Y.S.2d 220 (1984).
Id. at 184, 474 N.E.2d at 585, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
Id. at 179, 474 N.E.2d at 581, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 221.
Id. at 179, 474 N.E.2d at 581-82, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 221-22.
Id. at 184, 474 N.E.2d at 585, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
Id. at 185, 474 N.E.2d at 585, 485 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
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public ha[d] the right to be informed by proving that the
defendant's use was infected with material and substantial fiction
72
or falsity.,,
These two exceptions to the newsworthy privilege still provide

little help

in defeating the traditional

First Amendment

protections. For the defendant to lose the "newsworthy privilege,
[the] plaintiff must prove that the defendant acted with some
degree of fault regarding the fictionalization or falsification. "73
Both the incidental use and newsworthiness exceptions relate to

traditional

First

Amendment

protections. 74

While

First

Amendment protections generally extend to traditional news
disseminators, such as magazines, newspapers and television
broadcasts, 75 the exceptions to the statutes do much the same.
72. Lerman, 745 F.2d at 131.

73. Id. at 132. The plaintiff in Lerman relied on the alternate theory "as a
basis for defeating the newsworthy privilege." Id. Even though the falsification
was proved and was severe, the court did not find that the distributor was at
fault. Id. See also Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 127, 233
N.E.2d 840, 842, 286 N.Y.S.2d 832, 834 (1967) (holding that for a public
figure to sue under sections 50 and 51 of the New York Civil Rights Law, the
work must have been published with knowledge of falsity or "with a reckless
disregard for the truth"), appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969).
74. In fact, First Amendment protection parallels can also be drawn in that

public figures rarely succeed in bringing a successful cause of action under the
Civil Rights laws by virtue of their being susceptible to more public interest
than ordinary citizens. See Rand v. Hearst Corp., 31 A.D.2d 406, 298
N.Y.S.2d 405 (1st Dept. 1969), aff'd, 257 N.E.2d 895 (N.Y. 1970). In Rand,
the court held that a comparison of a new author to a public figure in the
literary world was of public interest, thus warranting protection under the
newsworthy exception to the New York Civil Rights Statutes. Id. at 410, 298
N.Y.S.2d at 411. The author included on the cover of her book an excerpt
from a newspaper review of the book where a reviewer compared the writing
style of the author to the plaintiff, Ayn Rand. Id. at 407, 298 N.Y.S.2d at
408. The court found that the comparison was of public interest and that by
merely achieving the level of public figure made a person "newsworthy." Id.
at 410, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 411. Noting the judicial narrowing of the New York
"right of privacy" statutes, the court found that the use of plaintiff's name was
not a violation. Id. at 411, 298 N.Y.S.2d at 411-12.
75 See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting, Inc., 433 U.S.
562 (1977).

The plaintiff, a performer, sued the defendant

for just

compensation for broadcasting the plaintiff's entire act without his consent. Id.
The Court held that even though his act was news, the broadcast of the "entire
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Moreover, similar to traditional First Amendment jurisprudence,
the New York "exceptions" afford at least some protection to
"quasi-newsworthy" uses that are done in conjunction with a
commercial endeavor. It might even be fair to say that
magazines, newspapers, and television broadcasts are rebuttably
presumed to fall into the category of news disseminators.
Further, in order to sustain a cause of action, those asserting a
Civil Rights violation must demonstrate that the commercial
exploitation of the "unauthorized use" outweighs fostering the
free exchange of ideas.
As an example of exploitation outweighing public interest, in
Onassis v. Christian Dior-New York, Inc., 7 6 a look-alike of
Jacqueline Onassis placed in an advertisement, was found to be
violative of the New York Statute. 7 7 The court stated that "[n]o
one is free to trade on another's name or appearance and claim
immunity because what he is using is similar to but not identical
to the original." 78 The court found that the commercial nature of
the venture so outweighed the protected nature of speech that
publishing the picture alone was enough for a successful privacy
claim and the plaintiff need not show that her name was attached
79
to the advertisement.
IV.Categorizing the Internet
The most difficult problem in determining whether the
unauthorized use of a person's name or likeness involving the
Internet is unlawful is determining the nature or category of
media into which the Internet falls. In correlation with this is
determining the extent of traditional First Amendment protections
that should be afforded on-line providers for "advertising" done
act pose[d] a substantial threat to the economic value of that performance." Id.
at 575.

76. 122 Misc. 2d 603, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1984), aff'd, 110 A.D.2d 1095, 488 N.Y.S.2d 943 (Ist Dep't 1985).
77. 122 Misc. 2d 603, 615, 472 N.Y.S.2d 254, 263.
78. Id. at 612, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 261.
79. Id. at 615, 472 N.Y.S.2d at 263.
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in conjunction with their services, whether the advertising
appears on the Internet or elsewhere.
In Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve Inc.,80 for the first time, a
federal district court was required to determine the structural
status of electronic information services for purposes of deciding
whether an electronic information system operator could be held
liable as a "publisher" for third-party statements transmitted on
the system. 81 In Cubby, the court took on a functional approach
in attempting to analogize the new technology. 82 The court
commented that Compuserve and the operators of electronic
bulletin board systems functioned more like distributors than
publishers of the information.83 Analogizing the Internet to a
book distributor, the court noted that "Compuserve may decline
to carry a given publication altogether, [but] in reality, once it
does decide to carry a publication, it will have little or no control
over the publication's content." 84 Furthermore, like a large
distributor of print media, an electronic information system
operator has "no duty to monitor each issue of every
85
[publication] it distributes."
Not only did the Cubby decision categorize electronic
information system operators as distributors, but the court also
provided insight into how a court may deal with the issue of the
extent of their First Amendment status. 86 Although not addressed
directly, the court suggested that "Compuserve retained its full
rights as a First Amendment speaker even when functioning in its
role as a distributor and that, in that role, it actually enjoined a
greater measure of protection against liability than do print
80. 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).

81. Id. at 138. Cubby was brought under state libel laws. Id. at 139. The
defendant, Compuserve, provided access to an electronic bulletin board where
an allegedly defamatory statement was published by one of its subscribers. Id.
at 138. The plaintiff sued Compuserve claiming that the electronic information

service
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

operator was liable as a "publisher." Id at 139.
Id. at 140.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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publishers. ' 87 This quasi-expanded "speaker status may well be
justified, [as one commentator pointed out], but it would seem to
provide EIS [electronic information system] operators with a
First Amendment windfall, allowing them to gain all of the
benefits of publisher status while escaping much of the burden of
liability." 88
While the publisher/distributor distinction in Cubby may not
have an overall impact on the First Amendment conflicts with the
right of publicity, the difficulty of placing the Internet into a
category is apparent. In viewing the traditional news media, the
Internet is a unique instrumentality. While it is capable of being a
disseminator of news, its overall purpose is not confined to that.
Rather, its status changes depending on the user. There are
various "web" sites dedicated to information dissemination, but
there is also the capability of a web site being dedicated to a
commercial venture -- such as a bulletin board advertising items
for sale. 89 There are also sites that are quasi-informational and
quasi-commercial, offering useful consumer information while at
the same time promoting a particular product. 90
The amorphous nature of the Internet leads to the ultimate
question of how such a medium will and should fit into the
legislative and judicially created categorizations. The free
87. Miller, supra note 17, at 1197.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Scherman v. Kansas City Aviation Ctr. Inc., 1993 WL
191369, at *5 (D. Kan. May 14, 1993).

90. See Peter H. Lewis, Personal Computers: Instant Information. N.Y.
TIMEs, Sept. 18, 1990, at C6 (discussing "Prodigy," an on-line service that is
both informational and commercial and can be accessed by paying a fee); Felix
H. Kent, Roundup of 1995 and a LookAhead, N.Y. L.., Dec. 15, 1993, at 3

(stating that the travel industry is making use of the Internet as both an
"infobase" and a way to market their services); Penny Parker, Neiman Marcus
plans catalogin nzagazinefornat, THE DENVER PosT, Dec. 11, 1995, at E-02
(discussing Maytag's home page offering tips on appliances, cooking, laundry,
etc.); Nancy Doucette, Aetna's newest location - on the Internet, 138 (No.
11) ROUGH NOTES 26 (Nov. 1995) (describing Aetna Life and Casualty

Company's experimental Internet site providing useful information and
enabling a consumer to receive an insurance quotation through an e-mail
service).
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exchange of information, at such a rapid pace and to unlimited
ends via the Internet, could possibly create multiple avenues for
commercial exploitation of likenesses and names.91 These uses
may often go unchecked. In light of the Cubby decision, the Stern
court was the first court to address the issue of whether the
Internet should be categorized as a news disseminator worthy of
First Amendment protections with respect to right of publicity
violations. 92

V. The Stern Decision
In Stern v. Delphi Internet Services Corporation,93 the court
held that the use of a public figure's photograph and name to
promote a bulletin board service fell within the incidental use
exception to the New York Civil Rights Law. 94 The plaintiff,
"Howard Stern, a controversial radio talk show celebrity and
heavily promoted ... [talk show host] announced his candidacy
for the office of Governor of the State of New York in the spring
of 1994. " 95 Delphi, a "for profit" access provider to the
"information superhighway," set up an on-line electronic bulletin
board to debate the merits of Stem's candidacy, and
correspondingly, to advertise their product. 96 In June of 1994,
Delphi placed a full page advertisement in the New York
Magazine and the New York Post which featured a photograph of

91. See, e.g., Elliot Zaret, Elvis does an encorefor his fans .. . this time
on the 'Net, THE DETROIT NEWS, July 13, 1995, at IA (discussing an Elvis

Internet page displaying "tour and other information, pictures of interesting
Elvis memorabilia and a list of Elvis software to download").
92. For a discussion of the Internet's "news disseminator" status as it
relates to defamation law, see David J. Conner, Cubby v. Compuserve,
Defamation Law on the ElectronicFrontier,2 GEO. MASON IND. L. REV. 227

(1993).
93. 165 Misc. 2d 21, 626 N.Y.S.2d 694 (Sup. Ct. New York County
1995).

94. Id. at 26, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
95. Id. at 22, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 695.
96. Id.
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Stem and used his name in the advertisement. 97 The court
acknowledged that it was the first to deal with the novel issues of
"whether Delphi's electronic bulletin board service [was] to be
treated as a news disseminator, whether the incidental use
exception [was] applicable, and [what was the] defendant's
98
entitlement to First Amendment protection0l."
In analyzing these issues, the court stated that although only
paid subscribers could access the service, the electronic bulletin
board was "analogous to ...

a news vendor, .

.

. book store, or

letters-to-the-editor column of a newspaper, which require[d]
purchase of the0 materials for the public to actually gain access
to the information carried." 99 The court went on to state that
because of its status as a "news disseminator," the incidental use
exception applied. 10 0 Moreover, "[a]ffording protection to online computer services when they are engaged in traditional news
dissemination, such as in this case, is the desirable and required
result." 10 1 The court recognized that an on-line service was also
primarily used as entertainment and drew an analogy to
television, which was a medium that engaged in both news
dissemination and entertainment. 102 Furthermore, because
Stem's candidacy was the subject of public debate,
unquestionably protected, the "use of Stem's name and likeness
in the advertisement was afforded the same protection as would
be afforded a more traditional news disseminator engaged in the
103
advertisement of a newsworthy product."
The repercussions of the Stem decision are multiple. Not only
did the court allow the nonconsensual use of Howard Stem's
likeness for advertising purposes, but the court essentially took a
new technology and applied traditional "right of publicity"
97. Id. The photograph was "of Stern in leather pants which largely
exposed his buttocks." Id. Stem did not allege that Delphi obtained the
photograph unlawfully or improperly. Id.
98. Id. at 24, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 697.

99. Id.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. at 25, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 697.
Id. at 26, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 698.
Id.
Id.
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analysis to it without accounting for the differences between the
Internet and other forms of media. Moreover, in its analysis, the
court apparently, and perhaps inadvertently, combined elements
of the "newsworthiness" exception with elements of the
"incidental use" exception before ultimately determining the
picture was an "incidental use." 104 In doing so, the court failed
to take into account precedent which, until Stern, was limited to
allowing news disseminators to advertise representative samples
of their previous products. The Stern court did not consider that
the advertisement in question was not a representative sample of
Delphi's previous work, but rather a "hook" that was intended to
entice consumers to purchase Delphi's Internet access
subscription. This difference takes the case entirely out of the
realm of previous "incidental use" cases because the court was
almost forced to draw upon the rationale of the "newsworthiness"
exception (via Stem's campaign being a matter of public debate)
in order to validate the unauthorized picture as being an
"incidental use."
The decision in Stern opens the door to a broader interpretation
of First Amendment protections not only as applied to the
Internet, but to all forms of advertising. It would have been one
thing to classify the Internet as a "news disseminator" so that
"unauthorized likenesses" that are actually displayed on the
Internet could be regarded as "incidental uses." It is another to
classify the Internet as being synonymous with an access provider
so that Internet "news disseminator" status extends to the product
that accesses it, and enables advertising done outside the Internet
to be protected.
The vacillating nature of the Internet should not lead to a
perfect categorical fit for purposes of determining what First
Amendment protections should be applied to a traditional "news
disseminator." The nature of the Internet itself is conducive to
multiple avenues for commercial exploitation that include
advertising the service itself. This is much different than any
previous case decided under the New York statute and an
important distinction that should have been addressed in Stern.
104. Id. at 31, 626 N.Y.S.2d at 701.
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Delphi, unlike newspapers or magazines, was not primarily in the
news dissemination business, but in the business of selling a
product to the public - a product that, perhaps, had an attenuated
"incidental" link to disseminating news. The Stern court's
analogy to television is flawed in many respects. Although both
television and the Internet have the capacity to provide
entertainment as well as news, likenesses portrayed on television
generally advertise a network presentation as opposed to enticing
the consumer to purchase the television itself.
Although arguably an access provider is more than a software
package, and, in fact, is a purchased "subscription" to the
bulletin boards it sponsors, the problem with previous "incidental
use" cases still remains. The photograph of Stem was not a
representative sample of the quality and nature of Delphi's
bulletin boards, which, it is assumed, are not pictorial in nature.
It was a visual inducement for the subscriber to pay to participate
in the written exchange. It is likely no accident that the picture
Delphi chose was provocative in and of itself. That merely led to
the efficacy of the ad, which likely attracted more subscribers
than would have a bland announcement or a less provocative
picture. While admittedly it might appear that the analysis
separating bulletin board from access service from outside
advertising is splitting hairs, it is an important distinction if only
to point out that the Internet is unlike any other media that has
allegedly infringed upon the right of publicity.
The categorization that has likened the Internet to other forms
of media now allows for more expansive interpretations of
"incidental use" and "newsworthiness." Such interpretations may
not only enable bulletin board operators broader First
Amendment protections with respect to violations of the right of
publicity, but may allow any advertiser such protections. What
was once considered "incidental use" because it was a
representative sample of the medium, may now fall into the
"incidental use" category by virtue of including within it the
image of a persona of contemporary public interest - a quasinews oriented "incidental use" that is neither a representative
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sample of the medium nor an item of news itself, yet protected
under the exceptions to the statute.
Although the leap from Stern to the erosion of New York's
Civil Rights Statute might seem extreme, it is plausible. While
not closely scrutinizing the precedents that lead to the
categorization of traditional print and speech medium, the New
York Courts opened the door to a more nebulous standard. This
standard potentially strengthens protections both for Internet
service operators and media outside the Internet that draw on the
slim rationale that "public interest" might very well equate with
First Amendment protection.

CONCLUSION

The synonymous classification of Internet and access provider
suggested by Stern is too broad and may destroy traditional "right
of publicity" guarantees. The Stern decision must be narrowly
interpreted and applied. Courts should engage in a case by case
meaningful investigation of the type of advertisement involved
and whether or not its "public interest" truly outweighs its
commercial purpose. Only then can the New York Civil Rights
Statute, and other similar state statutes allowing a cause of action
for the commercial exploitation of someone's name or likeness,
stack up against the broad and possibly insurmountable First
Amendment protections granted by the Stern decision.
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